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 VIEWPOINT: War in the Tribal Zone 
Planning for Victory in the Long War: Tribal Conflict, the War on 
Terror, and a New US Tribal Command 
by Barry S. Zellen 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
Coalition warfare with sub-state tribal allies has become an increasingly important method to 
ensure victory in the Long War, especially in those numerous chaotic border zones where the 
assertion of state sovereignty remains most muted, and where the roots of protracted conflict 
remain most firmly planted. These tribal zones define the new front lines in the Long War, 
formerly known as the Global War on Terror (GWOT) but currently described as a series of 
interconnected Overseas Contingency Operations. Viewed apart, these conflicts seem to have 
little in common with one another.  
But when viewed from a high level, they present numerous commonalities, and even while 
dispersed geographically they could be effectively viewed as a single theater of operations, which 
we could accurately describe as Global Operations in Tribal Territories. Many are rugged alpine 
war zones, most along porous borders where sub- and trans-state indigenous minorities continue 
to live a largely traditional lifestyle, and where state sovereignty is at best an aspiration but which 
in fact is largely a figment of the imaginations of mapmakers. In these tribal zones, governance 
remains a tribal affair with age-old systems and structures in place to ensure a social and political 
order. While sometimes described as “ungoverned,” this is a misnomer: in the absence of an 
overarching assertion of national sovereignty, there remains a continued tribal sovereignty as 
there has been for eons. It is this continued tribal sovereignty, if properly understood, that can lay 
the foundation of an enduring world order, and which can ensure an enduring peace if properly 
understood, effectively nurtured, and properly engaged.  
To coordinate this effort at a global level requires the formation of a new functional unified 
combatant command (UCC), the US Tribal Command (TRIBALCOM), with responsibilities for 
unifying and wielding American military power in these fractious tribal zones the world over, 
whether between states or within states, wherever our opponents can find sanctuary, and plot 
attacks against us, our allies, or our vital economic and strategic interests, whether Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where Osama Bin Laden has long found sanctuary, 
or the anarchic Somali coastal communities where clans still define the most durable political 
units, and where criminal pirate gangs operating in this stateless realm threaten international 
shipping. In such places, tribal chiefs and clan elders are the de facto leadership, and without 
their support, victory will elude us. 
War in the Tribal Zone  
During the last few years, we have re-learned the art of tribal warfare, and more important, 
coalition warfare with tribal allies, a military and diplomatic art we have long excelled at, from our 
pre-revolutionary engagements in King Philip’s War, to our decisive conquest of the western 
plains during the three long centuries of the Indian Wars. While seldom celebrated, these 
strategic experiences have defined our nation’s approach to military power, adapting European 
strategic concepts to our new, frontier nation emerging from the virgin wilderness of the New 
World. When America went out into the world in the twentieth century as a world power, its 
approach to war was intimately shaped by these engagements, and the lessons learned along a 
chaotic and expanding frontier where state sovereignty collided with the remnants of tribal 
sovereignty. America’s colonial experiences in the Philippines and in the Americas were marked 
by its offensive application of methods cultivated during its Indian Wars, and used against foreign 
opponents on distant battlefields.  
While the Long War has been perceived largely as a civilizational clash between Islamist forces 
and the West, it is more accurately a continuation of the same millennial conflict that began when 
European states and pre-Colombian indigenous tribes collided in the Americas, and on other 
continents as well from Africa to Asia, and even throughout Europe’s own fractious medieval 
history. The perpetuation of these intense, asymmetrical, and often annihilatory clashes between 
modern states and pre-existing tribes has been a recurring axis of conflict for centuries, but has 
less often been perceived to be the salient fault-line of conflict—perhaps in part because the 
historical legacy of America’s own military expansion tends to be under-emphasized in favor of 
the preferred narrative of its founding myth: the triumphant victory of democracy over tyranny. 
Properly understanding the underlying tribal dynamic, however, is nonetheless essential—and 
can spell the difference between military defeat and decisive and enduring victory.  
During the Cold War period, numerous battles were fought between East and West, but more 
often than not these conflicts were waged in weaker states, many only just emerging from the 
colonial experience. In several of these Cold War hot spots, sub-state indigenous minorities 
controlled substantial swaths of territory, and were engaged in protracted conflicts with 
newcomers to their homelands. The ideological lens that defined these conflicts was but a mask 
to an underlying clash of tribe and state; not in all conflicts, to be sure, but in many, from the bitter 
civil war in Guatemala that raged for half a century, pitting the descendants of Spanish colonists 
against the remnants of the Mayan nation that once ruled over the highlands of Central America, 
to the decade-long anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan, where the United States entered into a 
unique war-time alliance with Afghanistan’s tribal peoples.  
Today’s Long War again features many of these same sub-state entities in the notoriously 
fractious state of Afghanistan, which is more an amalgamation of tribal enclaves, some of whom 
are allied with us, and others such as the Taliban, a post-Soviet movement that pacified much of 
post-war Afghanistan in the 1990s, and the Al Qaeda movement, which also emerged from the 
anti-Soviet struggle and whose founders were once part of America’s war-time coalition against 
the Red Army. During the long anti-Soviet Jihad, it was Afghanistan’s many tribes, never truly 
united apart from their common occupying foe, that rose up, under American arms, against the 
militarily superior Soviet armed forces, holding their own, and later turning the tide of that war, 
until Moscow’s military commitment evaporated amidst the sweeping and frenetic pace of 
domestic reforms and revolution that resulted in the Soviet collapse. This unique coalition of tribal 
allies helped to rout the mighty Soviet Red Army, proper payback for Moscow’s own proxy victory 
over America and its allies in Indochina a half-generation earlier.  
Then, America’s military alliance with the Montagnards and other indigenous allies nearly 
achieved victory against the hated, centralized Vietnamese Communist forces; but in that long 
engagement, it was America’s will that evaporated first, resulting in a strategic withdrawal even 
after a decade of tactical victories, and our nearly successful creation of a democratic republic in 
the south modeled on the South Korean and Taiwanese example. Even in defeat, much was 
learned of long-term strategic and tactical application. But because that knowledge was not 
properly internalized or codified into doctrine, it was soon lost—with painful consequences in the 
early years of the Long War.  
While much of post-World War II international relations theory has been influenced by Waltz’s 
famously elegant “three images,” with the individual, state, and system defining the salient levels 
of analysis of the international environment, many of our post-war challenges have taken place in 
the nooks and crannies of the international arena where a “fourth image” seems to be at work, a 
tribal image. This is a realm that is in many ways “pre-state,” and where modern state sovereignty 
remains only still emergent. These places are neither ungoverned, nor truly failed states but are 
rather “pre-states,” and are thus governed in a manner that is more reminiscent of the medieval 
order, where sect and tribe often asserted a more salient ordering principle than the still 
developing state. The tools required to bring order to these regions are thus uniquely tailored to 
the pre-state realm, and will require a specific expertise. Traditional tools of statecraft, refined by 
the centuries of post-Westphalia diplomatic and military history, will be of only limited utility here. 
That is why in the mountains of Afghanistan, anthropologists work side-by-side with our 
warfighters mapping the human terrain; and during the recent stand-off in the Indian Ocean, FBI 
hostage negotiators were deployed along side of Navy SEALs.  
A New UCC for Tribal Operations 
Since the end of World War II, American military power has been organized under several unified 
commands, some regional in structure while others oriented by their function. A new US Tribal 
Command (TRIBALCOM) would be a little of each; its Area of Responsibility (AOR) would not be 
confined to one corner of the globe but would unite the many remote regions where tribal 
governance remains the most salient form of effective governance and where modern state 
power remains unconsolidated into a single AOR. It would similarly possess a unifying functional 
theme, one broadly described as counterinsurgency (COIN) but which could, as seen during the 
Cold War battles, be applied defensively or offensively, in the form of counterinsurgency 
operations and through the fostering offensive proxy insurgencies—depending on the specific 
dynamics, and whether the governing power is an ally or opponent of the United States. This 
potential strategic duality is compelling. As is the persistence of the state-tribe conflict as a fault 
line of conflict for the last half millennium, and even further back to Roman times and the fractious 
medieval period that followed, before modern European states had yet to rise.  
TRIBALCOM would be designed to integrate and operationalize the tactical and strategic 
dimensions of tribal coalition warfare; to expand upon our current COIN doctrine and to modify it 
for application in new theaters of conflict, and for both defensive and offensive operations; to 
coordinate the training and deployment of special operations forces, intelligence agents, regular 
armed forces—as well as teams of post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, and information 
operations experts, to help our war-time coalitions in the tribal zone survive the transition to 
peace, and thereby plant a firm foundation for a new postwar order.  
UCCs evolve over time, responding to changes in the strategic landscape. The very first, in fact, 
established in 1946 by President Truman, reflected the strategic contours of the post-war 
environment, and included the Alaskan Command, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean Command, 
European Command, Far East Command, Northeast Command, and Pacific Command. In 2008, 
there were ten UCCs, six defined by their regional AOR and four by their specific functionality. 
The regional UCCs include Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), 
European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 
and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), while the functional UCCs are Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and 
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).  
Each new conflict is perceived, and operationalized, to some degree through the regional lens of 
its UCC, limiting potential cross-command synergies, and more importantly, the flow of ideas and 
accumulated historical knowledge that could contribute to the development of doctrine, and 
promote the diffusion of tactical and strategic insights gained during out-of-area conflicts past and 
present. That is why the creation of a new UCC to unify military planning and operations in all the 
tribal zones where the Long War is being waged, and those where future conflicts will surely be 
fought, will be of such great value.  
TRIBALCOM will be dedicated to extracting knowledge from the many military conflicts of the 
past that were waged along a state-tribe axis, and to the development and codification of a new 
doctrine for the waging of coalition warfare, and the creation of enduring war-time as well as post-
war alliances with sub-state tribal entities. As we saw in the post-Vietnam period, where the stain 
of defeat led to an unfathomable loss of so much strategic and tactical knowledge that had been 
acquired during that long conflict, and led to a shift toward a higher-tech form a conventional 
warfare better suited to the Central Front—one that avoided the frustrating complexities of 
counterinsurgency but which also fostered a consequential erosion of institutional memory of our 
many COIN experiences—America’s long-term strategic interests are not served by 
compartmentalizing information borne of one military experience, and preventing that knowledge 
from enriching America’s repository of doctrinal knowledge for posterity.  
Strategic forgetting can be as destructive a force as any strategic blunder, since knowledge—as 
Sun Tzu noted centuries ago, and as echoed by later theorists from Machiavelli to Clausewitz and 
now to Petraeus—is power, and must be wielded effectively for victory to be possible. As learned 
in America’s successful COIN effort in the Sunni heartland of Iraq, coalition warfare with sub-state 
tribal entities can turn the tide of war, helping to achieve a military victory in a struggle considered 
by many to have been a lost cause.  
As chronicled by NPS professor James Russell in his forthcoming book, Innovation in the 
Crucible of War: The American Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq, 2005-2006, the bottom-up 
innovation process took place in real-time, pacifying a conflict zone where blunt conventional 
military power proved to be a double-edged sword, and where more precise and calibrated force 
was required in conjunction with a diplomatic offensive at the clan, village, and tribal level. This 
helped to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, proving that President Bush’s intuition as 
Commander-in-Chief was correct and that the salient lesson of Vietnam was not that the cause 
was lost, just our will—and that a smarter, more committed application of military power, and a 
quicker process of integrating successful battlefield innovations into evolving doctrine, could 
change the outcome of a conflict, and thus redefine the very flow of history.  
Indeed, in Vietnam the Tet Offensive was a tremendous tactical failure for the Viet Cong, resulting 
in their near-annihilation; but strategically, it was a victory for the NVA which not only watched its 
rival for political power in the South get wiped out by American and ARVN forces, but at the same 
time saw America’s will for continued war sapped by the surprise VC offensive, never to recover. 
Hanoi smartly snatched victory from the jaws of defeat that time; but America had learned much 
in the course of fighting that long war, and had its will not been so eroded back home, it may well 
have achieved a lasting victory—securing its ally in the south, and rolling back its opponent in the 
north through tribal coalition warfare with the hill tribes of Vietnam, Laos, and perhaps even 
southwest China. The map of postwar Indochina could have looked much different; instead of 
oppression and genocide, we’d have instead witnessed liberty taking root in the region’s fertile 
soils.  
In tribal zones, where formal state sovereignty never fully reached, borders tend to be porous, 
and sub-state and trans-state tribes, stateless nations, and minority cultures tend to predominate 
at the local and regional level. Politics in these zones can be complex, with inter-clan and inter-
tribe rivalries and strong anti-colonial sentiment toward their central governments—providing 
ingredients for micro-level alliances in the Long War. When engaged in military operations in 
these tribal zones, it is imperative to understand the detailed nuance of tribal identity, culture, and 
politics in order to comprehend these foundational building blocks of a new political order, and to 
nurture allies and strategic partners around the world, whether as part of the Long War or in 
future conflicts—such as against a rising China, whose southwestern frontier is one of the world’s 
most complex ethnocultural regions.  
Indeed, with minority populations like the Miao (Hmong) and Yi numbering in the millions (there 
are some eight million Yi, and nine million Miao in China today), as well as numerous other 
minorities like the Naxi numbering in the hundreds of thousands, many could stand alone as 
nation-states, much as the Hmong of Laos long dreamed, transforming the political geography of 
the region. As the U.S.-Montagnard war-time coalition demonstrated during the Vietnam War, and 
as our current efforts forging new bonds with tribal minorities in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, 
these efforts can not only spell the difference between victory and defeat, but also lay a 
foundation for a new and enduring order.  
From GWOT to TRIBALCOM 
President Bush famously declared “Mission Accomplished” after piloting his S-3B Viking jet onto 
the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, formally announcing an end to major 
combat operations—only to discover that the war in Iraq was anything but over, and would soon 
enter into a chaotic phase as conventional operations transitioned to asymmetrical warfare, and a 
complex insurgency burst forth in a frenzy of violence. On that day, the war between two states 
ended, and a new war—between the armed forces of the victorious state and the newly 
emancipated sub-state components of the defeated state—began. President Obama campaigned 
hard against the tactical and strategic errors of his predecessor, and pledged to withdraw U.S. 
combat troops from Iraq. But even as the President implements his disengagement plan from Iraq, 
he has already increased America’s troop commitment to Afghanistan—announcing a 17,000-
troop surge of his own on February 17, 2009, and will consider the addition of further troops in the 
months ahead should the fight require it. After five, long years of war, the sub-state struggle 
inside Iraq was now largely won, enough so that the White House could shift its attention to the 
even more complex and dangerous sub-state struggle inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
While engaging in an Afghani surge reminiscent of the very strategy he campaigned so hard 
against in Iraq, the President has nonetheless declared the “War on Terror” to be over. Not 
finished, nor won—but in rhetorical terms, the term “Global War on Terror” has been retired. The 
retirement of the GWOT terminology came to national attention on March 30, 2009, when 
Secretary of State Clinton told the press that the new administration had “stopped using the 
phrase, and I think that speaks for itself,” noting she had not “gotten any directive about using it or 
not using it. It’s just not being used.” At around the same time, the media reported that Pentagon 
staff had received a memo the Office of Security Review that explained the White House “prefers 
to avoid using the term ‘Long War’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT). Please use ‘Overseas 
Contingency Operation.’”  
This new, less catchy phrase has now been used publicly by several top officials, from the DoD to 
the OMB. But frustration with the GWOT’s terminology is not new. Even President Bush came to 
regret the one-size-fits-all simplicity of the term he made famous. As he said in 2004, “We 
actually misnamed the war on terror, it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who 
do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the 
conscience of the free world.” President Obama’s rhetorical redefinition of the GWOT as a series 
of nameless “Overseas Contingency Operations” seem to have as much to do with the GWOT’s 
controversial verbiage as it does with his desire to redefine the conflict along a more logical axis 
of conflict. Indeed, despite the change in terminology, President Obama remains fully engaged 
militarily, and the architect of our successful Iraq counterinsurgency, General David Petraeus, 
remains Commander of CENTCOM, a post he has held since October 31, 2008 and to which he 
was promoted by President Bush. Thus far, it appears that Obama’s doctrine is a mirror image of 
his predecessor—applying America’s COIN doctrine largely as developed during the previous 
administration. 
To succeed in Afghanistan and Pakistan will require detailed cultural knowledge of this expanding 
war zone, much as was painfully but effectively acquired in Iraq, in order to identify who among 
today’s opponents might become, with proper incentives, new friends and allies, bringing order 
from the chaotic mix of clans, tribes, sects, and movements that define the region’s fractious 
political geography. And to ensure the lessons learned from these conflicts are preserved in 
American doctrine, to benefit our warfighters as they engage new opponents in different parts of 
the world, will require a commitment to the preservation of these important strategic and tactical 
innovations, and this will be a primary mission of TRIBALCOM.  
Tribal Security and the Foundations of Order 
The poet and philosopher Santayana once said, “Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it.” But as the even more famous poet and philosopher Yogi Berra 
explained, “It ain’t over ‘til it’s over.” That is why it remains imperative that America look beyond 
the rhetoric to the underlying roots of conflict, and to counter its opponent with more than de-
escalatory rhetoric, and instead to offer up field-tested ideas that have proven their worth under 
fire, as we did in Indochina, and later Central America and the Balkans, and now in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
There is a wealth of knowledge, and a wealth of experience, to be gained by aligning America’s 
tribal warfare experiences under one unified command, and this could give America’s fighting 
men and women an important strategic advantage in the current battle and in tomorrow’s wars as 
well. The methods identified, operationalized, and systematized on the front lines of the Long War 
could serve as a cornerstone for a new doctrine to guide military operations in the tribal zone, and 
to be codified in a new field manual on tribal operations, one tailor-made to restore political order 
to the chaotic tribal zones that define the many fronts where the Long War is being fought, and 
which no doubt will define the front lines of future conflicts where the modern state and pre-state 
tribal entities continue to collide. 
Indeed, once the Long War concludes, these tribal zones will remain strategically important for 
the coming peace and could serve as vital beachheads and internal fronts from which American 
power can be nimbly projected in the event of new conflicts arising. Abandoning our hard-won 
gains in these tribal zones would only result in future setbacks to American power, as we 
witnessed after our Mujahideen allies routed the Soviet Red Army in 1989, only to see our 
commitment to their cause wane upon the Soviet collapse, as our attention turned elsewhere. 
Just as our continued, multi-generational military presence has helped ensure the peace in 
Europe, Japan and Korea, a similar long-term commitment to the security of these tribal zones 
where the current war is being fought will be essential to ensure our hard-won victories in the 
Long War do not become tomorrow’s missed opportunities. It is no coincidence that our past 
strategic withdrawal from chaotic tribal zones have come back to haunt us, as evidenced by 
events unfolding in Afghanistan and Somalia in recent times.  
With a new US Tribal Command in place to coordinate these many fluid fields of battle, present 
and emergent, and help ensure their successful transition from war to peace, it becomes more 
likely and not less that the day will one day come, perhaps even in our lifetimes, when America 
can wind down its final Overseas Contingency Operation—and truly declare a hard-fought, and 
well-earned, “Mission Accomplished” in a war that critics have long suggested would never end. 
Under the guidance of TRIBALCOM, past and present knowledge can intermingle, enhancing our 
efforts in the field, to transform the roots of chaos into the foundations for a lasting peace, and a 
new and enduring world order.  
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